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Abstract
In this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms
(such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical
special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and
are not directly affected by policy outcomes. They are hired by citizens, or groups of
citizens, to act as intermediaries on their behalf with policymakers. In our analysis
we address two basic questions; why do commercial lobbying firms exist, and what
are the implications of their existence for social welfare? We answer the first part
of this question by proposing that commercial lobbying firms possess a verification
technology that allows them to improve the quality of information concerning the social
desirability of policy proposals. This gives policymakers the incentive to allocate their
scarce time to lobbying firms. Essentially it is this access to policymakers that lobbying
firms sell to their clients. To address the question of social welfare we construct a
simple general equilibrium model that includes commercial lobbying firms, and compare
the equilibrium obtained under market provision of lobbying services to the first best
optimum. We find that the market level of lobbying services can be socially either too
large or too small, and characterize when each will be the case.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature on lobbying focuses almost entirely on the activities of special
interest groups such as trade and occupational associations. These groups are motivated to
try to influence the political process because they are directly affected, either ideologically
or via financial gain, by the policy outcomes in question.1 They are typically concerned
only with the subset of policies relevant to the organizing principle around which they have
coalesced.2 It is surprising then to discover that by some measures only 40% of lobbying
in the US is performed by representatives of special interest groups, and that they are
not responsible for the observed rapid growth in lobbying expenditures over the 1999-2008
period.3 The preponderance of lobbying activity in the US, and a great deal of lobbying
activity in Europe, is performed by for-profit commercial lobbying firms that are typically
neither directly affected by the policies they lobby over, nor have ideological preferences
over policy outcomes.
Commercial lobbying firms sell their services as intermediaries between citizens or spe-
cial interest groups and policymakers. These intermediation services include direct advo-
cacy to branches of government, legal and political consulting, advice about the political
feasibility of clients’ objectives, facilitating the formation of coalitions and grass root orga-
nizations, legislative drafting, legislative witness hearing preparation, and public relations.
To our knowledge the behavior of commercial lobbying firms and their economic implica-
tions have not been analyzed in the theoretical economics literature, and it is our intent
that this paper begins to fill this void.4
The commercial lobbying industry is both large and influential.5 For example, in the
1See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a detailed review of special
interest group activities.
2See Olson’s (1965) seminal work for the formation of special interest groups.
3Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) show that there has been a rapid growth of commercial
lobbying. They show that, the share of special interest group lobbyists amongst all lobbyists has fallen
from 60 percent in 1999 to 40 percent in 2008. Also, total lobbying expenses have increased by 30 percent
in that time period but a constant growth for commercial lobbying revenues doubled commercial lobbying
revenues. Commercial lobbying revenues accounted for 60 percent of all expenses in 2008.
4The only empirical paper in this area is the recent working paper by Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi
(2011). This was written concurrently with the analysis presented here, and represents an out of sample
test which confirms the bulk of our theoretical reasoning.
5See Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) for both measures of the scale of commercial lobbying
and empirical analysis of their activities. Their empirical findings support many of the assumptions made
in our model.
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U.S. lobbying expenditures in 2010 were $3.47 billion at the federal level and there were
12,951 registered lobbyists.6 The majority of whom were commercial lobbyists. The top 25
commercial lobbying contracts in 2010 ranged between $1 and $10 million.7 These expendi-
tures are related to the political representation of lobbying firms’ clients and exclude their
clients’ political campaign contributions.8 Commercial lobbying firms explicitly advertise
their political experience, expertise in specific political and legal areas, and political con-
tacts.9 That they advertise their experience and contacts suggests that most relationships
between lobbyists and policymakers are personal and typically closed to outsiders.10 These
are features we shall incorporate into our analysis.
That lobbying is an important phenomenon in almost all Western democracies is re-
flected in the increase in public concern over the influence of lobbying on the political
process. Recent parliamentary discussions and reforms in the United Kingdom and the
European Union serve only to emphasize this point.11 Pressure to regulate lobbying activ-
ities has grown in most democratic countries. This regulation has taken the form of public
registers, codes of conduct, and activity reports, such as those adopted recently in the
United States, Canada, and Australia.12 Also, policy contingent payments to policymak-
6This compares to $1.9 billion in campaign contributions reported by the US Federal Election Committee
for the 2009-10 congressional electoral cycle.
7The identities and revenues are from www.opensecret.org; a website from the Center for Responsive
Politics. Their data are collected from the individual lobbying registrations and reports provided by the
US Senate Office of Public Records. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) requires professional lobbyists to
register and report their activities on the federal level.
8Numerous commercial lobbying firms possess their own Political Action Committees (PAC), and com-
mercial lobbyists make campaign contributions to politicians with whom they share engagements in political
issues. See the website of the Center for Responsive Politics for the identities of lobbying firms with PACs
and Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) for an analysis of lobbyists’ campaign contributions.
9Many lobbying firms advertise on their websites the number of employees with Congress or House staff
experience or the number of years their employees held public offices.
10This observation was confirmed by University of Oregon Associate Vice President for Public & Gov-
ernment Affairs Betsy Boyd, who is in charge of the university’s political representation and registered as a
lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. In recent empirical work Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen
(2011) and Eggers (2010) focus on the close personal relationships of politicians and lobbyists. They use
lobbyists’ former staff experience and party affiliation as an indicator for personal networks and analyze
how changes in political offices affect the revenues of lobbyists.
11The Public Administration Select Committee of the British parliament reported in 2009 about the
practice of lobbying in the United Kingdom and public mistrust. The committee focused initially on lobby-
ists “for-hire” and emphasized the growing appearance and mistrust of commercial lobbyists in the United
Kingdom. The European Parliament implemented a mandatory registration; the European Commission
changed their rules in 2008 from self-regulation to a voluntary register for lobbyists. Unfortunately, data is
unavailable for the United Kingdom and the European.
12The U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) regulates lobbying activities on the federal level in the
United States. The regulation includes registration, frequent reports, and penalties for potential violations.
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ers are widely illegal, and the amounts of campaign contributions are frequently limited.
Additionally, there is a recent trend towards demands for increased transparency over pol-
icymakers’ personal income and other financial records. This increased transparency is
intended to provide the public with valuable information about policymakers’ behavior.
The public has also expressed concerns that professional lobbying may crowd citizens out
of the political process. However, it remains the case that most Western democracies have
very limited regulation of lobbying activities.13
The conventional wisdom of lobbying is that special interest groups or citizens may have
valuable information that an imperfectly informed policymaker wishes to learn. Generally
as a society we care about the quality of policy decisions and benefit from this provision
of information. Unfortunately, private incentives to misrepresent information may limit
what a policymaker may learn from the signals sent by citizens or special interest groups,
and hence the quality of their policy decisions and social welfare may suffer. It is clear
that politicians are cognizant of these issues; Tony Wright MP, Chairman of the Public
Administration Select Committee (PASC) of the British parliament in 2009, stated:
“Lobbying enhances democracy, but it can also subvert it. Government has
accepted that it should be more open to outside interests and ideas, and this has
brought benefits. But there are risks around influence and public mistrust of
government, and these risks have not been managed closely enough.”14
We argue that commercial lobbying firms engage in information verification activities
and exist to (at least partially) mitigate this problem. That they maximize profit and
respond to standard market incentives may allow them to credibly transmit information
that cannot be transmitted by special interest groups. These market incentives, which
we shall formalize as an agency relationship between policymakers and lobby firms, allow
The LDA is intended “[...] for the disclosure of efforts by paid lobbyists to influence the decision-making
process and actions of the Federal legislative and executive branch officials while protecting the constitutional
right of the people to petition the government for a redress of their grievances.” In Canada, the Lobbying
Act (2008) extended the previous regulation and requires a registration of activities, provides a code of
conduct, and limits post-employment opportunities. In 2008, the Australian government introduced a code
of conduct and a public register to regulate lobbying activities.
13See Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) for an extensive overview of lobbying regulations across countries.
14Tony Wright’s MP statement is taken from a press notice by the Public Administration Select Com-
mittee (2009).
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for the credible transmission of information of a given “quality” where we shall make the
notion of quality precise shortly.
Our commercial lobbyists are different from the “experts” and “advocates” that have
been discussed in the economic literature. Experts, advocates and commercial lobbyists
all possess some form of private information, but differ in the compensation schemes that
determine their payoffs and hence in their incentives. An expert usually possesses some
form of private information that a policymaker wishes to learn and receives a payoff directly
affected by the policymaker’s decision.15 An advocate is usually an agent who argues on
behalf of a client and is rewarded on the basis of the results achieved or possibly the process
by which those results are achieved.16 In contrast a commercial lobbyist is not rewarded (at
least directly) for results, neither are they directly effected by the policymakers decision; a
commercial lobbyist acts as an intermediary between clients and policymakers, they offer
their clients access to policymakers and provide resources to policymakers in exchange for
this political access.
Commercial lobbying firms typically have many clients (and many more potential
clients) but have relatively fewer political contacts. It seems natural then to assume the
relationship between commercial lobbyists and their clients is mediated via a competitive
market on which there is a market clearing price for intermediation services, however for
the relationship between the commercial lobbyists and policymakers it seems more natural
to assume this is mediated via agency contracts. This again contrasts with the experts and
advocates literatures where the agency relationships are between the expert or advocate
and their client, here the agency relationship is between the lobbyist and the policymaker.
In addition to analyzing the consequences of special interest groups supplying infor-
mation, the established literature also considers financial contributions designed either to
15Exemplary studies are Crawford and Sobel (1982), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Austen-Smith (1994),
and Krishna and Morgan (2001) who study the behavior of a single or multiple experts who advise an
imperfectly informed decision-maker. A biased expert has an incentive to misrepresent information, and a
decision-maker may want to consult competing experts for improved decision-making. Krishna and Morgan
(2001) provide a review of this literature.
16Dewatriport and Tirole (1999) study the behavior of advocates. They point out two compensation
schemes for advocates: Decision-based rewards and information-based rewards. Decision-based rewards are
based on the advocates’ achievements for the client; information-based rewards are based on how outcomes
were achieved. In their analysis Dewatriport and Tirole (1999) focus exclusively on decision-based rewards
and show that informational benefits are maximized when each advocate argues for a specific cause.
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influence electoral outcomes or to influence policy choices. We also shall allow commercial
lobbyists to make financial contributions to policymakers, and, as in the existing literature
these expenditures are typically distortionary. However they are distortionary for different
reasons. In the model to be presented below information quality and financial contribu-
tions are substitutes. Policymakers incent commercial lobbyists to supply their preferred
combination of information quality and financial contributions by offering them agency
contracts that link these elements to political access.
In order to focus on the implications of commercial lobbying we shall develop a simple
general equilibrium model in which there are only three types of agents: citizens, lobbying
firms, and policymakers. All three agents types are assumed rational and self interested,
there is no benevolent social planner (except a fictitious one used to generate a benchmark
for making welfare comparisons). The number of policymakers will be determined by a
constitution. Those not chosen as policymakers may decide to be citizens or lobbyists, and
this choice will satisfy a simple arbitrage condition. Our model will be constructed such that
there is no rationale for the formation of classical special interest groups. Singleton citizens
pursuing their own private interests via the political process could in principle decline the
intermediation services of lobbying firms and make direct representations to policymakers,
that is be their own special interest group. However we show that this is typically not
an equilibrium outcome in our model, and frequently it is not socially desirable. Policy
decisions will be assumed to have private benefits to the citizens that propose them, but will
also have spillover effects for the other agents in the model. These spillovers may be socially
desirable or undesirable and are not perfectly observed ex ante. The role of commercial
lobbying firms is to observe a signal correlated with the social desirability of any proposal,
that is they “verify” them; they thus have the potential to pass along to policymakers a
portfolio of proposals some of which have been verified and some not, and amongst those
that have been verified a mix of proposals that they observed to be associated with positive
and negative signals. That is they may pass along a portfolio of a given expected quality in
the sense of the associated expected value of spillovers. Generally in our model more policy
proposals is a good thing, but more verification is also desirable. For a given number of
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agents in the economy there will be an optimal mix of citizens, lobbyists and policymakers.
This optimal mix will typically not be achieved as a market outcome, which may involve
too much or too little lobbying, furthermore given that resource allocations are market
driven the second best constitution (number of policymakers) may be greater of less than
at the first best optimum.17
2 The Basic Model
We assume an economy with three types of agents: citizens, c, lobbyists, l, and policy-
makers, p. The total population is of size T consisting of C citizens, L lobbyists, and P
policymakers. Naturally C + L+ P = T . Each agent in the economy may be any of these
three types. The number of agents who are policymakers will be assumed to be determined
by a constitution, the residual T − P = L+ C agents may choose their own type.
Each citizen is endowed with a policy proposal which if enacted by a policymaker will
yield a private benefit of pic > 0 and a spillover to the rest of society of ec. These spillovers
may be either positive or negative and are assumed to be absolutely large enough such that
pic + ec > 0 if ec > 0 and pic + ec < 0 if ec < 0. That is proposals with positive spillovers
are socially desirable, while those with negative spillovers are not. There are a number of
possible interpretations for these spillovers; they may be externalities or associated with
impure public goods in the traditional sense, or they may represent the public provision
of capital or education etc. Total output of the economy is simply the sum of all realized
private benefits plus spillovers.
The ex ante exogenous probability of a positive spillover is ρ(e+), and the complemen-
tary probability of a negative spillover is ρ(e−) = 1 − ρ(e+). Overall, the expected social
value of a randomly drawn proposal is assumed positive; this ensures potential progress
through political decisions.
Policy proposals may be either presented directly by citizens to policymakers, or indi-
rectly via commercial lobbying firms. We shall assume that all policy proposals that are
17Our analysis can also explain the empirically relevant case of the simultaneous provision of information
and financial contributions by competing lobbyists in equilibrium,a feature which is not present in the
analysis of direct lobbying.
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presented to policymakers, and are not known to be socially undesirable, are enacted and
thus yield their private benefits and spillovers. In this sense policymakers are assumed
to act only as “gatekeepers” whose role is to decide how to allocate their scarce time by
choosing which agents proposals listen to. The solution to the policymakers problem then
specifies political access rules.
2.1 Citizens
Citizens act as rational, self-interested agents.18 Each faces two basic decisions; whether or
not to become a lobbyist, and if they decide to remain a citizen what to do with their policy
proposal endowment. They have three possible choices for their endowment, attempt to
gain direct access to a policymaker so as to realize its payoffs, attempt to gain access for
their proposal indirectly by employing a commercial lobbying firm to act as an intermediary
with a policymaker on their behalf, or do not attempt to gain access for their proposal.
Direct access to a policymaker, if achieved, is costless. Employing a commercial lobbying
firm to act as an intermediary requires they pay the fee of k.19 We assume that a citizen
can hire only one lobbyist. The citizen’s payoffs associated with each outcome are then
Πc =

pic + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains access directly,
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains no access,
pic − k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if c chooses lobbying firm l and the proposal is presented, or
−k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if c chooses lobbying firm l and the proposal is not presented.
(2.1)
18There is a large literature on lobbying as a form of rent-seeking going back to Tullock (1967), Krueger
(1974), and Buchanan (1980). A recent extensive survey is supplied by Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad
(2008). In our approach lobbying is not pure rent-seeking.
19We assume that lobbyists are compensated for their overall services they provide to clients and not
just rewarded for success. The use of “lobbying success fees” - where the lobbyist’s compensation from the
client depends on the lobbyist’s success - is sensitive, since such fees are often illegal or restricted. Lobbying
success fees are illegal in connection to U.S. federal government contracts - see 10 U.S.C. 2306(b) - but
exceptions apply for lobbying Congress members - see the Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance (2011) for
further details. Also, 43 U.S. states prohibit the use of lobbying success fees and 3 states restrict them -
see the Center for Ethics in Government’s (2010) “50 State Chart: Contingency Fees” for an overview.
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Notice that we assume each member of the economy shares in the sum of total spillovers
from all enacted policy proposals, A; we may interpret this as supplying a public good
which is subject to crowding. It follows that for T large enough we may assume that each
individual neglects the effects of their own decisions on their share of spillovers.
2.2 Lobbying Firms
There are L commercial lobbyists each of whom constitutes a lobbying firm. Each firm
accepts proposals from nl clients and charges a lobbying service fee of k per proposal. Each
lobbyist l receives political access of a˜lp from policymaker p. Overall, lobbyist l receives
political access of a˜l =
pl∑
p=1
a˜lp from their pl political contacts, and it is this access which
they sell to their citizen clients.
In return for access the lobby firms supply policymakers with the proposals of their
clients and potentially also financial contributions of f lp to each political contact.20,21 We
assume that lobbying firms have expertise which allows them to investigate the potential
spillovers of a policy proposal.22 This expertise takes the form of a verification technology
which returns a signal x, x ∈ {x+, x−}, which is positively correlated with the sign of
the spillover. Formally we have, ρ(e+|x+) > ρ(e+) and ρ(e−|x−) > ρ(e−). Investigated
proposals with a positive signal have greater expected social value than unverified proposals;
verified proposals with a negative signal have negative expected social value. The expected
20Financial contributions are not linked to policy outcomes here, they exist as part of the price of
access paid by commercial lobbyists; for the implications of policy contingent financial contributions see
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Besley and Coate (2001). In general,
a financial contribution is any lobbyist’s expense that benefits a policymaker but does not improve available
information. This can be a monetary transfer, campaign contribution, gift, entertainment, travel, etc, etc.
21The assumption that only commercial lobbyists make financial contributions is a simplification. How-
ever, Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) provide empirical evidence that lobbyists make larger cam-
paign contributions than their clients and that out-of-house lobbyists make larger ones than in-house lob-
byists. They also show that lobbyists’ campaign contributions are a standard practice and can be linked to
politicians with whom they overlap in lobbying and political issues.
22This assumption was confirmed in an interview with a professional lobbyist, and is also supported by the
conclusions of Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) who construct a measure of lobbyists’ concentration
in specific issues. They distinguish between “specialists” who focus on a few issues and “generalists” who
are involved with a larger range of issues. They find that out-of-house lobbyists are more likely to be
specialized than in-house lobbyists.
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spillover of a policy proposal can be summarized by
ρ(e+|x+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x+) (pic − s) > ρ(e+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−) (pic − s)
> 0 > ρ(e+|x−) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x−) (pic − s) (2.2)
where ±s is the magnitude of the spillover ec.
Verification is costly, and is represented by the increasing convex cost function F (ml),
where ml is the number of proposals verified. In addition each proposal, whether verified or
not, incurs the lobbyist a processing cost, represented by the increasing convex cost function
G(nl), where nl is the number of proposals processed.23 Additionally, the verification and
processing costs have the property F ′(0) = G′(0) = 0.
Lobbyists also enjoy a share of aggregate spillovers, hence their payoffs are
Πl = knl −G(nl)− F (ml)−
pl∑
p=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec. (2.3)
Notice that the lobbyists’ payoffs imply that their only direct interest in the information
they pass along to policymakers operates through their contributions to total spillovers
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec, so contrary to the conventional literature that examines information transmission,
they have no incentive to misrepresent the signals they receive.24
2.3 Policymakers
Each of the P policymakers has a given endowment of time that allows them to approve
a maximum of Ap proposals. Hence policymakers in aggregate can approve a total of
A ≤ PAp proposals. Each policymaker has to decide how to allocate political access across
citizens and lobbyists. Policymakers do not have an independent verification technology.
Nevertheless, each policymaker p can design rules a˜cp(.) and a˜lp(.) that determine the
conditions of access for citizens and lobbyists. Financial contributions by lobbyists may be
23Processing costs are any lobbyist’s expenses that do not involve the verification technology, clients must
be met and paperwork filed even if the quality of a proposal is not investigated. These costs can be related
to internal organizational costs or external networking costs.
24See Crawford and Sobel (1982), Potters and van Winden (1992), Austen-Smith (1994), and Krishna
and Morgan (2001) for some exemplary studies in this literature.
10
a part of these access rules.25
Policymakers receive a dollar denominated ego rent from holding office of θ, potentially
receive financial contributions, f lp, from their lp lobbying contacts, and enjoy a share of
aggregate spillovers.26 The valuation of financial contributions is parameterized by α with
α ∈ [0, 1]; this may be interpreted in several ways, if these financial contributions are illegal
or considered unethical then α may be interpreted as the degree of dishonesty or corruption,
alternatively if the transfers are in-kind then α represents the efficiency of transfers. The
payoff for policymaker p is then
Πp = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec. (2.4)
The objective function gives a hint as to the nature of the policymaker’s problem in
designing access rules; if there is a trade off between financial contributions and spillovers,
as indeed we shall argue, then this will be reflected in the optimal access rules.
3 Social Welfare
The analysis begins with a characterization of the social welfare optimum, which acts
as the benchmark for our analysis. The social planner maximizes ex ante social welfare
by choosing the allocation of all resources in society; this includes choosing the number
25There is a well developed literature on the purchase of access via financial contributions by special
interest groups, see for example Austen-Smith (1995) and Lohmann (1995), however in each of these con-
tributions access is purchased with the aim of transmitting information so as to influence the policymaker,
here access is purchased by commercial lobbyists so as to sell this access to their clients. Another litera-
ture focuses on the strategic interaction of observable information acquisition and campaign contributions.
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) discuss an information externality that arises when several interest groups
compete via information acquisition and financial contributions. This information externality reduces in-
terest groups’ incentives to provide policy relevant information to policymakers and results in complete
separation where those interest groups with better information technologies provide only information and
other interest groups provide only financial contributions. Here, information is policy specific and the em-
pirically relevant case of a simultaneous provision of information and financial contributions by lobbyists
can be explained in equilibrium. Dahm and Porteiro (2008) consider the possibility that the acquisition
of informations can benefit or harm an interest group. The uncertainty of information makes financial
contributions more likely or serve as “damage control” for undesirable information. Here, policymakers
announce political access rules, and their preferences determine the effectiveness of each means to gain
political access. The access rules reward commercial lobbyists’ effort, and induce lobbyists to provide the
desired mix of information and financial contributions.
26The only role this ego rent plays in our analysis is to motivate agents to accept the role of policymaker
in the degenerate case where α = 0.
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of policymakers and level of lobbying activities. There are two potential social welfare
optima, with either a positive or zero level of commercial lobbying. This obviously speaks
to the question: Should lobbying be illegal?
3.1 The Social Welfare Function
We assume that the social planner is a utilitarian social welfare maximizer that attaches
equal weights to the payoffs of all members of society. Social welfare is thus
Πs =
C∑
c=1
Πc +
L∑
l=1
Πl +
P∑
p=1
Πp. (3.1)
This may be written as:
Πs = Al
[
pic − k + 1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+ (N −Al)
[
−k + 1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+Ac
[
pic +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+(C −N −Ac)
[
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+Nk −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl)−
L∑
l=1
f l +
L
T
A∑
c=1
ec
+Pθ + α
P∑
p=1
fp +
P
T
A∑
c=1
ec, (3.2)
where N is the total number of proposals passed to lobbying firms for potential political
representation; Al is the number of policy proposals presented by lobbyists; the remaining
N − Al proposals are passed to lobbying firms but are not presented to policymakers.
Citizens may access policymakers directly. There areAc proposals presented by citizens; the
remaining proposals are neither presented directly or indirectly by citizens. The financial
contributions f l are transfers from lobbyists to policymakers.
In expected terms, (3.2) reduces to
E [Πs] = Apic −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl) + Pθ + (α− 1)
L∑
l=1
f l + E
[
A∑
c=1
ec
]
. (3.3)
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The details of expected spillovers are given by
E
[
A∑
c=1
ec
]
=
(
Ac +
L∑
l=1
ul
)
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]+ ρ(x+) L∑
l=1
mls
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)] ,
(3.4)
where ul is the number of proposals presented by lobbyist l that have not been verified.
We break our analysis of the social planner’s problem into several stages. First, we
consider the social planner’s problem in the absence of commercial lobbying. With no
commercial lobbying there is no verification and the problem collapses to specifying an
optimal division of societies population between citizens and policymakers. Second, we
explore the social planner’s problem when commercial lobbying exists; in this eventuality
the problem also includes determining the optimal number of lobbyists, their verification
activities, and the financial contributions to be made to policymakers by lobbying firms.
Having completed these two stages we then compare expected social welfare with and
without lobbying to determine when lobbying is socially desirable.
3.2 Social Optimum without Commercial Lobbying
In the absence of commercial lobbying the social planner’s problem reduces to choosing
the numbers of policymakers and citizens so as to maximize expected social welfare. Since
there is no verification technology and the expected social value of an enacted unverified
policy proposal is positive, it follows that the social planner wishes to maximize the number
of policy proposals enacted.27 Since each agent in the economy may be either a citizen or
a policymaker, it follows that if there are fewer policy proposals (citizens) than the total
time of policymakers, it would be socially improving to convert a policymaker into a citizen
(ignoring indivisibility issues); alternatively if the total time endowment of policymakers
exceeds the number of policy proposals, then it is socially improving to convert a policy-
maker into a citizen. It immediately follows that the social welfare optimum in the absence
of commercial lobbying may be summarized by
27We are of course assuming that ego rents from holding political office are not so large such that the
social welfare optimum involves the entire population consisting of unproductive policymakers!
13
Proposition 1. The socially optimal solution in the absence of commercial lobbying re-
quires that the government resources equal the number of available policy proposals and
citizens - PAp = A and PAp = C.
Proof. The proof of this and all subsequent propositions and lemmas may be found in the
appendix.
Given T = C + P and proposition 1, the socially optimal number of policymakers and
citizens in the absence of commercial lobbying is simply
P ∗ =
T
Ap + 1
and C∗ =
TAp
Ap + 1
. (3.5)
Maximal expected social welfare in the absence of commercial lobbying is then
E[Πs∗] =
T (Ap (pic + s [ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]) + θ)
Ap + 1
, (3.6)
where E[ec] = s [ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] represents expected spillovers.
3.3 Social Optimum with Commercial Lobbying
When there are commercial lobbying firms in the economy the social planner’s problem
is considerably more complex. The social planner must choose the optimal allocation of
the population between the three roles of citizen, lobbyist and policymaker, the optimal
level of verification of proposals by lobbing firms, the portfolios of proposals passed from
lobbying firms to policymakers, the number of proposals passed to policymakers directly
by citizens, and the financial contributions to be made to policymakers by lobbying firms.
As a first step we take the distribution of the population across the three roles as given
and examine optimal portfolios passed from commercial lobbying firms to policymakers
and their financial contributions, we then employ these results to characterize the rest of
the solution to the social planner’s problem.
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3.3.1 Optimal Portfolios
Suppose initially that the social planner has identified the optimal distribution of the pop-
ulation between policymakers, citizens and lobbyists, we then take this allocation as given
and derive the optimal portfolios of policy proposals consisting of verified and unverified
proposals. The maximization problem then involves choosing ml and f l, as well as the al-
location of political access between citizens and lobbyists, so as to maximize the objective
function (3.3), or
max
nl,ml,ul,rl,f l,Ac
E [Πs] = PAppic −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl) + Pθ + (α− 1)
L∑
l=1
f l
+
(
PAp − ρ(x+)
L∑
l=1
ml
)
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]
+ρ(x+)
L∑
l=1
mls
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)] (3.7)
s.t. nl = ml + ul + rl, (3.8)
where ul is the number of unverified but presented proposals, and rl the number of proposals
that are accepted from citizens but not presented to any policymaker. (Perhaps obviously,
at the social welfare optimum, ul = rl = 0.)
After substituting (3.8) into (3.7) and differentiating we obtain the first-order conditions
∂E [Πs]
∂ml
= −∂F (m
l)
∂ml
−∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
+ρ(x+)s
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] ∀ l
(3.9)
with ml > 0 because of F ′(0) = G′(0) = 0,
∂E [Πs]
∂ul
= −∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
+ s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] ≤ 0 ∀ l, (3.10)
∂E [Πs]
∂rl
= −∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
≤ 0 ∀ l (3.11)
15
with rl = 0 because of ml > 0 and G′(.) > 0,
∂E [Πs]
∂f l
= α− 1 ≤ 0 ∀ l, (3.12)
∂E [Πs]
∂Ac
= s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] > 0 ∀ c. (3.13)
It is straightforward to show that the second-order conditions with respect to verifica-
tion are satisfied because F (.) and G(.) are increasing and convex.
Given the described optimization problem and first-order conditions, we can state the
following.
Proposition 2. If the solution to (3.7) is at a corner, then all proposals are verified by
lobbyists and all access is granted to lobbyists, who present only those proposals with positive
verification signals. Each lobbyist presents ml∗ = PA
p
ρ(x+)L
proposals.
If there is an interior solution, then lobbyists verify m∗ proposals and present only
those with positive verification signals. The remaining government resources are employed
to approve unverified proposals presented by citizens.
Whether or not the solution for m∗ is interior has an interesting implication. At
the corner solution all proposals presented are verified, that is all policymakers’ time is
allocated to lobbyists with no access for citizens. There is in this sense complete, but
socially desirable, political capture. At the interior solution some unverified proposals are
presented to policymakers, it follows that as any proposal that passes through a lobby
firm incurs a processing cost, it is socially desirable that all unverified proposals come
from citizens. It follows that it is never socially desirable for lobbyists to act as pure
intermediaries for any proposals, which would amount to pure distortionary rent-seeking.28
If there is an interior solution, then the optimal number of verified proposals, m∗, is a
function of the spillovers’ magnitudes, the quality of the verification technology, as given
by the improvement in information about spillovers, and the costs of commercial lobbying
28For all unverified proposals it is true that ∂E[Π
s]
∂ul
< ∂E[Π
s]
∂Ac
.
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as below
m∗ = m
 s︸︷︷︸
(+)
,
verification technology (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ(x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e+|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e−|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 . (3.14)
Where the signs under the variables indicate the direction of the comparative statics effects.
If the magnitude of spillovers, s, increases, then it is more valuable to distinguish between
proposals with positive and negative spillovers and it is hence optimal to invest more
resources in verification. The same holds for the verification technology. If the technology
is more effective at distinguishing between proposals, then it is more valuable to invest
resources in verification. Notice that at an interior solution the optimal investigation
efforts m∗ are invariant with respect to the number of lobbyists, L, and policymakers, P .
The results differ at a corner solution, where the number of policymakers and lobbyists
determine the amount of verification. The amount of verification at a corner solution
depends positively on the number of policymakers, P , and individual political resources Ap,
and is decreasing in the number of lobbyists, L, and the likelihood of a positive verification
signal ρ(x+).
Also note that in both the interior and corner solutions, if policymakers discount fi-
nancial contributions, then these payments are not pure transfers, are therefore socially
wasteful, and are set to zero.29 However, if financial contributions are pure transfers, then
these payments are lump sum transfers and do not affect the social optimum.
3.3.2 The Socially Optimal Division of the Population
Maintaining the assumption that it is socially desirable to have a strictly positive number
of commercial lobbyists we may then employ our solution for m∗ to derive the following
Proposition 3. If commercial lobbying is socially desirable, then the optimum requires
that all government resources are employed to approve proposals, PAp = A. Lobbying
firms verify all policy proposals from citizens, ml∗L = C. Only policy proposals with a
positive verification signal are passed to policymakers, ρ(x+)m∗ = PA
p
L .
29The financial contributions are discounted by the degree of dishonesty. A policymaker with a lower
degree of dishonesty, low α, discounts financial contributions more than a more dishonest policymaker.
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Here the social planner requires that all policy proposals are verified. They then allocate
the population across the roles of citizen, lobbyist and policymaker such that there are
just sufficient policymakers to enact all proposals that are expected to receive a positive
verification signal from lobbyists, there are sufficient citizens to pass along to lobbyists
the number of proposals to give the required number with expected positive verification
signals, and there are sufficient lobbyists such that if each receives and verifies m∗ then
the expected sum of those proposals receiving positive verification signals equals the sum
of all policymakers’ time endowments.
It follows that given T = C +L+P and proposition 3, the socially optimal number of
policymakers, lobbyists, and citizens in the presence of commercial lobbying is
P ∗∗ =
ρ(x+)Tm∗
Z
, L∗∗ =
TAp
Z
, and C∗∗ =
TApm∗
Z
, (3.15)
where Z = ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗.
It then follows that optimal expected social welfare with commercial lobbying is
E[Πs∗∗] =
T (ρ(x+)m∗ (θ +Ap (pic + E [ec|x+]))−Ap (F (m∗) +G(m∗)))
Z
(3.16)
with an expected spillover of E[ec|x+] = s [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)].
3.4 The Social Planner’s Question: Should there be Commercial Lobby-
ing?
Intuitively the trade-off the social planner faces in deciding whether commercial lobbying
should be permissible or not is straightforward. If members of the population are lobbyists
they cannot be citizens or policymakers, hence the social cost of lobbyists stems from a
reduction in the number of proposals that can be presented and enacted. The benefit from
lobbying follows from the improvement in information arising from verification activities
and the subsequent avoidance of enacting some socially undesirable proposals. To help in
making these statements more precise we first state a simple lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal size of government is larger in the absence of commercial lobbying,
18
that is P ∗ > P ∗∗.
Lemma 1 isn’t quite as obvious as it might first appear. In the absence of commercial
lobbying policymakers approve all available proposals, and total proposals equal the sum
of all policymakers’ time endowments. When there is commercial lobbying not only are
some agents lobbyists, thus reducing the number of agents available to be policymakers,
but also since all proposals are verified and only those receiving a positive signal passed
on to policymakers, the number of citizens with proposals required to generate the pro-
posal received for any given number of policymakers must therefore also be greater; again
reducing the optimal number of policymakers.
We may now compare the payoffs in the two potential social optima, employing (3.6)
and (3.16) gives
E[Πs∗]− E[Πs∗∗] R 0⇔ (P ∗ − P ∗∗) (θ +Appic)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+Ap
(
P ∗E [ec]− P ∗∗E [ec|x+])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
+L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
R 0. (3.17)
The first term on the right hand side of (3.17) represents the pure private gains from
additional policymakers, that is the ego rents earned by the policymakers themselves,
and the additional private benefits realized because more policymakers can approve more
proposals. The second term gives the benefits from improved information when lobbyists
exist, but these are moderated by the fact that more lobbyists imply fewer policymakers.
The third term simply recognizes that commercial lobbying is costly. We conclude that
if the second term is absolutely larger than the sum of the first and the third, that is if
lobbying improves information sufficiently, then commercial lobbying is socially desirable.
We conclude that commercial lobbying tends to be socially desirable if; the verification
technology significantly improves information, ego rents and private benefits from proposals
are smaller, or the lobbyists cost of processing and verifying proposals are smaller.30
30One may argue that policymakers’ ego rents are of secondary interest in the welfare comparison.
Nonetheless, the welfare comparison can be summarized as a trade-off between the foregone private benefits
from direct political access and a larger government in the absence of commercial lobbying and the social
benefits from information improvement and better spillovers in the presence of commercial lobbying.
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4 The Market Outcome
In the previous section we characterized the social optimum. Here, we characterize the
market equilibrium and ask if this equilibrium is socially efficient. The basic structure
of preferences and technologies is the same as in the previous section. However, resource
allocations are now determined by market mechanisms. There are three markets in the
economy: A perfectly competitive intermediation services market on which citizens and
lobbyists trade intermediation services at the equilibrium price k, a political access market
on which lobbyists and policymakers trade access according to rules designed by poli-
cymakers (simple agency contracts), and a labor market on which agents are allocated
costlessly between the roles of citizens and lobbyists according to an arbitrage condition.31
To complete the market environment we need to specify an information structure.
4.1 Information Structure
The information structure adopted is deliberately simple and somewhat artificial; but is
designed to focus attention on the questions we wish to address. Here we want to explore
how market incentives in the presence of commercial lobbying distort social welfare from
the first best optimum. That is we are interested in how the constraints implied by the
market provision of these intermediation services effect welfare. We make our informa-
tional assumptions accordingly. We assume that ex ante no agent observes the spillovers.
However, all society’s members know the exogenous probabilities ρ(e+), ρ(e−), ρ(e+|x+),
ρ(e−|x+), ρ(e+|x−), and ρ(e−|x−). Further, citizens do not observe the lobbyists’ actions
or the interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. However, they can observe realized
political access a˜l and the number of clients nl of each lobbying firm l. Policymakers can
31The structure of the market environment with free access to the verification technology for lobbying
industry entrants but agency characteristics with access rules is supported by Bertrand, Bombardini, and
Trebbi (2011) as well as Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2011). Both highlight the imortance of
personal relationships and the barriers to entry for political access rather than limited access to expertise.
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observe both the verification efforts of lobbyists and the signals generated.32,33 That the
number of policymakers is determined by a constitution is common knowledge.
4.2 Citizens
Citizens are assumed to know the structure of the economy outlined above and take the
distribution of political access as given. A citizen can approach a policymaker directly
at no cost. If access is granted the proposal is approved. However, some approaches
may be unsuccessful, hence the citizens must calculate the probability of gaining access in
computing their expected payoffs. This probability is simply, A˜c/(C − N), where A˜c, is
total access granted by all policymakers to citizens, and C − N is the number of citizens
competing for this access.
As an alternative citizens may hire commercial lobbying firms to present their policy
proposals. These citizens cannot observe the lobbying firm’s activities and have to form
expectations about the likelihood that their proposals will be presented. Citizens observe
the amount of political access a lobbyist enjoys, a˜l, and number of a lobbyist’s clients, nl,
hence they correctly compute the probability that their proposal will be presented to a
policymaker to be a˜l/nl.
A citizen can always decide to be politically inactive, in which case the policy proposal
expires, and the citizen receives only a share of spillovers. If all government resources are
employed to approve policy proposals and if citizens must make their choices of whether to
present their proposals prior to lobbying firms engaging in any verification activity, then
citizens enjoy the same share of expected spillovers independent of their individual choices.
The citizen’s decision reduces to a maximizing the incremental payoff from this decision,
32This may be given the interpretation that policymakers are competent and ask lobbyists for “hard
facts,” which consist of research reports, from which they may deduce lobbyists’ verification activities.
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) adopt a set up in which a policymaker asks interest groups to provide
independent information from a reputable third-party. They cite in its support Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Laffont and Tirole (1990), and Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002a, b).
33In a companion piece, Groll and Ellis (2012), we allow the verification efforts of lobbyists to be private
information and explore repeated agency relationships between policymakers and lobbyists.
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∆E[Πc], where
∆E[Πc] =

A˜c
C−N pi
c if c chooses the direct approach,
a˜l
nl
pic − k if c passes the proposal to lobbyist l,
0 if c does not participate.
(4.1)
If citizens expect political capture by lobbyists, that is all political access goes to the
lobbying firms, then the choice alternatives reduce to hiring a lobbying firm or being
politically disenfranchised. Hence the demand for lobbying services satisfies
a˜l
nl
pic − k ≥ 0 for all l. (4.2)
Given the market structure for commercial lobbying, each citizen also has the oppor-
tunity to become a lobbyist.34 The decision, whether to enter the industry or not, depends
on the citizens’ and lobbyists’ expected payoffs. More specific whether E[Πc] R E[Πl]. We
shall assume that this market is perfectly arbitraged and will present this condition after
defining the payoffs to being a lobbyist.
4.3 Lobbyists
Commercial lobbying firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. They also receive a share
of total spillovers, but we assume the contributions of their own activities to aggregate
spillovers are sufficiently small such that they are neglected in their choice problems. Each
faces access rules devised by policymakers that specify a portfolio of verified and unverified
proposals to be presented by any given lobbying firm to any given policymaker. Policymak-
ers may also demand financial contributions from lobbyists as part of these access rules. We
assume that any lobbying firm that fails to deliver on the requirements of the access rule
34Citizens have free access to the verification technology. However, policymakers control political access.
This asymmetry is supported by Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) who argue that political access
is the scarce resource rather than expertise. To provide some further support for a perfectly competitive
lobbying industry notice that total U.S. lobbying expenditures in 2010 were $3.47 billion at the federal level
and there were 12,951 registered lobbyists, yet the top 10 U.S. lobbying firms only reported revenues from
lobbying services of around $252 million. This seems to suggest that the industry is not very concentrated.
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is immediately denied all access to the policymaker in question.35 Firm l′s optimization
problem is characterized by
max
nl
E[Πl] = knl −G(nl)− F (m¯l)− f¯ l. (4.3)
Each firm l must provide verification effort of m¯l =
∑pl
p=1 m¯
lp and financial contributions
of f¯ l =
∑pl
p=1 f¯
lp to its pl political contacts according to the terms of the access rules.
Each firm then chooses the number of clients to take on so as to maximize profits. The
first-order condition with respect to the number of clients is then
k =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
(4.4)
with nl > 0 because of G′(0) = 0.
For the agent to choose to be a lobbyist rather than become a citizen requires E[Πl] ≥
E[Πc].
4.4 Policymakers
Each policymaker takes the lobbying service fee, k, the size of each firm, nl, and the number
of lobbyists, L, as given and determines the distribution of their political resources, Ap, and
the access rule for lobbyists. The access rule consists of a required level of verification effort,
mlp, the number of policy proposals to be presented, and a given financial contribution,
f lp, for each lobbying firm.
A policymaker has to respect the lobbyist’s participation constraint and cannot force
his lp lobbying contacts to realize economic losses. Further, the policymakers play a Nash
game between themselves, that is each simply takes the access rules and behaviors of the
other, A−p, policymakers as given. We assume that policymakers value transfers at less
then their dollar-for-dollar value, so α ∈ (0, 1].36 This may be because these payments are
illegal and accepting them requires the use of resources to conceal their receipt, or they
35This is consistent with our informational assumptions here, and can be supported in a more complex in-
formational environment via a repeated agency relationship between policymakers and commercial lobbying
firms (see Groll and Ellis, 2012).
36The behavior of perfectly honest policymakers is discussed in the Appendix 8.2.
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may be in the form of in-kind transfers, or, perhaps, the policymaker is dishonest but has
some conscience about receiving transfers. The expected payoff for a policymaker is
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
E
 ∑
c∈A−p
ec
+ 1
T
E
[∑
c∈Ap
ec
]
. (4.5)
Given that all the policy proposals that will be presented have a positive expected
spillover effect, then each policymaker always exhausts political access.37 Any unverified
or positively verified proposal increases his share of expected spillovers. All proposals with
negative verification signals are ignored. Further, each policymaker may ignore some un-
verified proposals, rlp, because of time constraints. Political access is granted by each
policymaker as long as lobbying firms provide the requested verification efforts, financial
contributions, and policy proposals.38 A policymaker knows that a citizen would provide
only a single unverified proposal, but a lobbyist could provide verification efforts and finan-
cial contributions. Therefore, a policymaker has no incentive to allocate access to citizens
as long as lobbyists provide enough proposals.
The policymaker’s optimization problem is characterized by
max
mlp,f lp,a˜lp,rlp
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
E
 ∑
c∈A−p
ec

+
1
T
[
ρ(x+)
lp∑
l=1
mlp
]
s
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)]
+
1
T
[
lp∑
l=1
(
a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp
)]
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] (4.6)
subject to lobbying firms’ proposal constraint (with Lagrange multiplier ωlp)
nl = a˜lp + ρ(x−)mlp + rlp +
∑
h6=p
mlh +
∑
h6=p
ulh +
∑
h6=p
rlh for every lp (4.7)
37If there is political capture by lobbyists, then Ap =
lp∑
l=1
a˜lp.
38The number of unverified presented proposals can be written as ulp = a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp.
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and the lobbying firms’ participation constraint (with multiplier λlp)
nlk − f lp −
∑
h6=p
f lh − F (mlp +
∑
h6=p
mlh)−G(nl) ≥ E[Πc] for every lp.39 (4.8)
The first-order and associated complementary slackness conditions are
∂E[Πp]
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]−λlp∂F (.)
∂mlp
−ρ(x−)ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp
(4.9)
and ∂L
∂mlp
mlp = 0 and mlp ≥ 0,
∂E[Πp]
∂f lp
= α− λlp ≤ 0 for every lp (4.10)
and ∂E[Π
p]
∂f lp
f lp = 0 and f lp ≥ 0,
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
=
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]+ s
T
∂
∑
h6=l
a˜hp
∂a˜lp
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]− ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp, (4.11)
and ∂E[Π
p]
∂a˜lp
a˜lp = 0 and a˜lp ≥ 0, and
∂E[Πp]
∂rlp
= −ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp, (4.12)
and ∂E[Π
p]
∂rlp
rlp = 0 and rlp ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. Each policymaker with α 6= 0 extracts all potential resources up to the point
that each lobbyist with whom he has contact is indifferent between staying in and leaving
the industry.
This result is standard in the classical principal-agent literature, the only twist being
that the policymakers do not compensate their agents directly but rather transfer to them
an asset, access, which they sell to their citizen-clients.40
39Citizens and lobbyists realize the same expected share of spillovers independent of their choices, and
therefore take only private benefits into account.
40The principal-agent problem with moral hazard has its origins in the work by Mirrlees (1974, 1976),
Holmstro¨m (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). For an extensive review of the principal-agent literature
see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatriport (2005).
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Proposition 4. The solution to (4.6) may take one of four possible forms dependent on
parameter values:
1. If the solution is at a corner with respect to verified proposals, then all approved policy
proposals received positive verification signals. All remaining rents are extracted by
policymakers via financial contributions.
2. If the solution is at a corner with respect to verified and unverified proposals, then
then the solution to the policymaker’s problem involves lobbyists verifying mco pro-
posals, which exhaust a lobbyist’s financial resources, and presenting those proposals
which received a positive verification signal together with sufficient unverified propos-
als to exhaust access. No rents are extracted via financial contributions because of a
sufficiently small α. The amount of verification at the firm-level is determined by
F
mco +∑
h6=p
mlh
 = nlk −∑
h6=p
f lh −G
(
nl
)
− E[Πc|private ben.]. (4.13)
3. If the solution is interior with respect to verification and financial contributions, then
the policymaker’s problem involves lobbyists verifying m# proposals, and presenting
those proposals which received a positive verification signal together with sufficient
unverified proposals to exhaust access. All remaining rents are extracted by policy-
makers via financial contributions. The amount of verification at the firm-level is
determined by
∂F (ml)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] .
4. If the solution is at a corner with respect to financial contributions and the following
holds
α > ρ(x+)
s
T
(
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)) ,
then all approved proposals are unverified. All rents are extracted by policymakers via
financial contributions.
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Proposition 4 allows us to understand what determines the quality of information
demanded of lobbyists by policymakers. Policymakers value both information quality (be-
cause of expected spillovers) and financial contributions. The lobbying firms participation
and proposal constraints face the policymakers with a trade off between these two ob-
jectives. At two of the potential corner solutions the policymaker chooses either to have
all proposals verified and extract any remaining rents via financial contributions, or to
verify no proposals so as to maximize financial contributions. The two key elements in
this choice are the valuation policymakers place on financial contributions relative to the
valuation they place on spillovers (characterized by α) and the efficacy of the verifica-
tion technology in terms of how great an improvement in information is obtained from
the lobbyists’ signals. At the other corner solution policymakers do not value financial
contributions sufficiently and choose to exhaust lobbyists’ scarce financial resources via
verification efforts. At the interior solution the policymakers equates the marginal value
of extra verification, which equals the marginal opportunity cost in terms of lost financial
contributions, to the marginal value of their share of additional spillovers arising from an
improvement in information quality.
4.5 Market Equilibrium
The preceding sections characterize the behaviors of citizens, lobbyists and policymakers
faced by market incentives and the information structure described above. We may now
employ these results to derive the overall market equilibrium. This is characterized by
supply equals demand in the lobbying service market, a Nash equilibrium between policy-
makers in selecting agency contracts to offer lobbyists, and perfect arbitrage in the market
for allocating labor between lobbyists and citizens. We attain this equilibrium under the
assumption of a given constitution which specifies the number of policymakers, P¯ .
4.5.1 The Commercial Lobbying and Labor Markets
On the commercial lobbying market citizens demand commercial lobbying services up to
the point where their expected benefit equals the price, while each lobbying firm supplies
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lobbying services up to the point where the marginal processing cost of another proposal
just equals that same price, k; assuming symmetric lobbying firms, this leads to the equi-
librium condition
P¯Ap
Lnl
pic = k =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
for every l. (4.14)
The market clearing lobbying service fee depends on the number of clients, lobbyists,
government resources, private benefits from an approved proposal, and technology for
processing proposals.
On the labor market, agents can choose to be citizens or lobbyists, perfect arbitrage
and free entry into the lobbying market implies E[Πc] = E[Πl]. It now follows that
Lemma 3. In an equilibrium with a perfectly competitive lobbying market and a perfectly
arbitraged labor market, all citizens are clients of commercial lobbying firms, that is C =
nlL.
This is an immediate implication from the assumption that the market for lobbying
services is perfectly contestable. If a citizen exists who is not a client of a lobbying firm,
then he realizes no expected private benefits. Given that the costs of lobbying activities
are increasing and convex that citizen can always enter the lobbying industry at a lower
cost per client than pre-existing firms, hence all citizens must either be clients of lobbying
firms or become lobbyists themselves.
4.5.2 The Market for Political Access
On the market for political access policymakers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to lobbyists.
They require a given number or proposals be submitted, a certain percentage of which
must have been verified and have received positive signals, the remainder being unverified.
They also demand financial contributions. The commercial lobbying market equilibrium
conditions determine the number of proposals available from lobbying firms, while propo-
sition 4 determines the number of proposals that each lobbying firm will be required to
verify by policymakers. Given these pieces of information what remains is to apply some
adding up constraints to characterize equilibrium in the market for political access.
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We know that provided they can supply sufficient proposals policymakers allocate all
political access to lobbyists, so given that the number of policymakers is constitutionally
determined, it follows that in the symmetric case the supply of access (or demand for
proposals) is simply
a˜l =
P¯Ap
L
for every l. (4.15)
The number of clients per lobbying firm is given by
nl = ml + ul + rl for every l. (4.16)
However, recall that proposals that receive a negative verification signal are not presented
to policymakers, so the number of proposals actually supplied (alternatively the demand
for access) is given by
a˜l = ρ(x+)ml + ul for every l. (4.17)
Equating (4.16) to (4.18) gives the symmetric equilibrium condition for the political access
market expressed in per lobby firm terms, that is
ρ(x+)ml + ul =
P¯Ap
L
for every l. (4.18)
Now applying the fact that policymakers extract all residual rents from lobby firms via
financial contributions, we have that in a symmetric political access market equilibrium
the sum of financial contributions paid to lobbyists by firm l is given by
f¯ l = nlkl − F (m¯l)−G(nl) ≥ 0 for all l. (4.19)
We may now specify the per policymaker per lobbyist contract that clears the market for
political access, this consists of the triple {ml, ρ(x+)ml + ul, f¯ l
pl
}, where ml ensures that
given the demands of other policymakers each lobbying firm verifies m#, ul ensures each
policymaker has no unused time, and f¯
l
pl
extracts all residual rents.
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4.5.3 Full Equilibrium
The full market equilibrium is characterized by the market equilibrium conditions discussed
above and the population constraint
T = C + L+ P¯ , (4.20)
where P¯ is the constitutionally determined number of policymakers. Employing (4.15),
(4.21) and lemma 3 (twice) provides us with a three equations in three unknowns which
may be rearranged to give the implicit solutions
n#
1 + n#
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n#
=
P¯Appic
T − P¯ , L
# =
T − P¯
1 + n#
, and C# = n#L#. (4.21)
The equilibrium number of clients per firm, n#, may be shown to be unique and positive.41
Implying unique positive solutions for each of the variables in equilibrium. Exploiting these
results and using (4.15) and (4.16) we may obtain the equilibrium lobbying service fee and
the equilibrium level of political access per lobbying firm
k# =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n#
and a˜# =
P¯Ap
L#
. (4.22)
Political access is granted by policymakers in exchange for the presentation of port-
folios of proposals with requisite expected social value and financial contributions. For
the interior solution, the presented proposals consist of verified proposals with a positive
verification signal, ρ(x+)m#, such that
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m#
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] (4.23)
and unverified proposals described by
u# = a˜# − ρ(x+)m# ≥ 0.42 (4.24)
41See the Appendix 8.1.7.
42If there is a corner solution to the policymaker’s problem with respect to verification, then the equilib-
rium verification at the firm-level is m# = a˜
#
ρ(x+)
and u# = 0. However, if there is a corner solution with
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The equilibrium number of unverified unpresented proposals is therefore
r# = n# −m# − u# ≥ 0. (4.25)
The equilibrium amount of financial contributions per firm is
f# = n#k# − F (m#)−G(n#) ≥ 0. (4.26)
Notice that here each lobbying firm may both supply information and make financial
contributions despite being engaged in competition for political access. This contrasts
with Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) where some special interest groups make financial
contributions and others supply information. Which special interest group completes each
task depends on which has the superior information gathering technology. It also contrasts
with Dahms and Porteiro (2008) where a single special interest group supplies information
and financial contributions to a single policymaker.
This completes our description of the market equilibrium with commercial lobbying,
we next turn our attention to its welfare properties.
5 Comparison of the Market and Socially Optimal Outcomes
In the section 3.4 we described when the full information social welfare optimum is char-
acterized by positive levels of commercial lobbying, that is when the solution to the social
planner’s problem is interior or at the corner, which arises when the information improve-
ment that arises from the verification technology is large. In this section we maintain
this as an assumption, essentially we are assuming that the benefits from employing the
lobby firms’ verification technology outweigh the costs. We begin by explaining the differ-
ences between the full information social welfare optimum and market solutions, then we
investigate some policy options.
respect to financial contributions, then m# = 0 and u# = a˜#.
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5.1 The Socially Optimal and Market Levels of Verification and Financial
Contributions
Comparing the requests for verification and financial contributions made by a policymaker
in a market environment with their socially optimal levels allows us to identify the distor-
tions associated with an economy in which there is commercial lobbying. A social planner
takes all costs and benefits of commercial lobbying into account, but each policymaker in a
market environment neglects the value of spillovers to others and all costs that do not im-
pose direct constraints on their choices. Further, the value placed on financial contributions
by a policymaker provides them with an incentive to substitute financial contributions for
information quality.
Using (3.9) and (4.11), the verification effort levels determined by the social planner
and the verification efforts requested by policymakers relate such that
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m#
=
1
αT
(
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
+
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=m∗
)
. (5.1)
As a result, we can state the following.
Proposition 5. Comparing the verification effort levels for the full information social wel-
fare optimum and the requests by policymakers under the full information market outcome,
we have
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
R 1
αT − 1
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=m∗
⇒ m# Q m∗.
Proposition 5 is intuitive once we recognize that there are several distortions in oper-
ation. First, each policymaker receives only a share of aggregate spillovers and therefore
does not fully internalize all benefits from improved political decisions. The smaller is the
policymaker’s share of expected aggregate spillovers, through a larger population T , the
more likely is underverification at the firm level. Second, a policymaker recognizes and
responds to a trade-off between verification efforts and financial contributions constrained
by lobbying firms’ participation constraints. In contrast, a social planner does not respect
this trade-off, and indeed when α < 1 financial contributions are banned. The greater is the
weight the policymaker places on financial contributions the more likely is underverifica-
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tion at the firm-level. Finally, a policymaker ignores processing costs which are taken into
account by a social planner. As a consequence, higher marginal processing costs increase
the likelihood of oververification at the firm level.
Using lemma 2 and proposition 4, we can state the following.
Lemma 4. If α < 1, then policymakers may request financial contributions that are socially
inefficient.
Lemma 4 is trivially obvious since if a transfer from one agent to another is valued
more by the giver than the recipient there must be a welfare loss relative to the first best,
however in a second best sense inefficient transfers may be socially desirable. We know
that policymakers in this structure do not fully take into account lobbyists’ costs, or fully
internalize spillovers, such that they may request under or over verification of of proposals
as described by proposition 5 above. The value placed by policy makers on financial
contributions determines, in part, the trade off that they face and hence may offset their
incentive to engage in inefficient levels of verification.
5.2 The Social Optimum and Market Aggregates
In the preceding section we compared the market equilibrium contract offered by policy-
makers to citizens to the socially optimal levels of the variables determined in the contract.
Here we compare the levels of market aggregates to their socially optimal equivalents.
5.2.1 The Number of Lobbyists and Citizens
Recall that we are maintaining the assumption that a constitution fixes the number of
policymakers at the first best optimal level. Given this, this section ask if there is too
much or too little lobbying in the market equilibrium. We are not here asking if the
number of lobbyists is second best optimal, but are rather seeking to characterize and
understand the differences between the market outcome and the first best.
Employing proposition 5 and lemma 4, we may obtain the following
Proposition 6. Relative to the full information social welfare optimum
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• If there is oververification at the firm level, then the lobbying industry is more con-
centrated; with fewer lobbying firms processing more total proposals.
• If there is underverification at the firm level this leads to
– a less concentrated lobbying industry with more lobbying firms processing fewer
proposals in total if ρ(x+)m∗ > ρ(x+)m# + u#,
– a more concentrated lobbying industry with fewer lobbying firms processing more
proposals in total if ρ(x+)m∗ < ρ(x+)m# + u#.
If policymakers request more verification per firm than is socially optimal, then each
lobbyist receives more political access than is socially optimal. More political access per
firm increases the willingness to pay for a firm’s lobbying services and increases the firm’s
number of clients. More clients per firm and verification efforts increases processing and
verification costs, therefore the industry is more concentrated than at the socially efficient
level.
Alternatively if policymakers’ requests involve underverification at the firm level then
there are two possibilities The first case occurs when the policymakers’ requests for veri-
fication efforts cause lower firm verification efforts and each lobbyist receives less political
access than is socially efficient, then citizens are willing to pay less for a firm’s lobbying
services and the number of clients per firm decreases. Fewer clients per firm decrease veri-
fication and processing costs. As a consequence, the lobbying service fee is lower and there
are more lobbyists and fewer citizens than is socially efficient. The other case involves
each lobbyist receives more political access. This circumstance leads to fewer lobbyists but
larger firms than is socially efficient.
It is tempting to interpret the sum of policymakers and lobbyists as the “political
establishment” in which case the preceding results tell an intuitive tale. When policymakers
care very little about financial contributions relative to expected spillovers, then there
tend to be over verification of proposals at the firm level (proposition 5), and the political
establishment will be inefficiently small (proposition 6). However, when policymakers care
a lot about financial contributions relative to expected spillovers, then there will tend to
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be under verification at the firm level, and if this leads to to a less concentrated lobbying
industry, then the political establishment will be inefficiently large.
5.3 Social Welfare at the Market Equilibrium
Expected social welfare evaluated at the market equilibrium with self-interested policy-
makers and a perfectly competitive commercial lobbying market may be written as
E[Πs#] = P¯
(
θ + αf#L#
)
+ P¯E[ec|α]. (5.2)
Notice that this expression utilizes the fact that the policymakers extract all rents from the
lobby firms, and arbitrage between the roles of lobbyist and citizen ensures that they also
earn zero rents in equilibrium. What then remains are spillovers and the rents captured
by policymakers. The expected spillovers are defined by
E[ec|α] =
(
m#ρ(x+)
m#ρ(x+) + u#
)
s[ρ(e+|x+)−ρ(e−|x+)]+
(
u#
m#ρ(x+) + u#
)
s[ρ(e+)−ρ(e−)].
Expected spillovers, E[ec|α], depend on the weight the policymaker places on financial
contributions via the effect of α on m#, see (4.24).
Optimal social welfare when commercial lobbying is socially desirable, is
E[Πs∗∗] = P ∗∗ (θ +Appic)− L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗)) + P ∗∗E[ec|x+], (5.3)
where all proposals are verified and only those with positive verification signals are enacted.
Continuing to maintain the assumption that the constitution fixes the number of pol-
icymakers at their full information socially optimal number, P¯ = P ∗∗, allows the excess
of social welfare at the full information social welfare optimum over social welfare at the
market equilibrium, E[Πs∗∗]− E[Πs#] ≥ 0 to be summarized by
P¯Appic − L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
−αP¯f#L#︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ P¯
(
E[ec|x+]− E[ec|α])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(≥0)
≥ 0, (5.4)
which can be broken down into the three terms indicated. The first term is the potential
35
pure private gains for citizens and lobbyists in the social welfare optimum with commer-
cial lobbying. The second term gives the private benefits for self-interested policymakers
from financial contributions in a market environment. The difference between the first and
second terms has an immediate and intuitive interpretation. In the market equilibrium
policymakers set contracts so as to capture all private rents from lobbyists, while arbitrage
in the labor market ensured the rents enjoyed by lobbyists and citizens are equal, hence
policymakers capture all private rents. It follows that the difference between the first and
second terms in expression (5.4) is the difference between private rents in the first best
optimum and market outcomes, and captures the effects of the distortions on these private
rents. Notice that it need not be the case that private rents are greater in the first best,
as the socially planner trades off private rents against the benefits from spillovers via the
selection of the level of verification m∗. The third term in (5.4) identifies the change in
aggregate spillovers due to the distortions that arises because self-interested policymak-
ers may substitute unverified proposals with verified proposals to realize higher financial
contributions. This substitution cannot increase the expected quality of information and
hence the level of expected spillovers.
5.4 Welfare Improvements in the Political Structure at the Market Equi-
librium
To this point we have taken the number of policymakers as fixed at their first best level, and
the characteristics of these policymakers, in terms of their taste for financial contributions,
as exogenous. Suppose instead that the number and nature of policymakers could vary.
We might then ask; given resource allocations are market determined, how should the
number of policymakers be adjusted from their first best level and what taste for financial
contributions would we like these policymakers to have?43
To investigate this question consider social welfare evaluated at the full market equi-
43The more ambitious question asking how the market allocation compares to the second best social
welfare optimum is difficult to analyze at this level of abstraction, however it is amenable to numerical
analysis if functional forms are specified.
36
librium given there are P¯ policymakers
E[Πs#] = P¯
(
θ +Aps
(
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)))+ αL#f#
+ρ(x+)L#m#s
(
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)) , (5.5)
and suppose that here is a marginal increase for the number of policymakers, utilizing that
the verification efforts at the firm level are independent to the number of policymakers we
then obtain
∂E[Πs#]
∂P¯
= θ +Aps
(
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+αL#
∂f#
∂P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂L#
∂P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
(
αf# + ρ(x+)m#sψ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, (5.6)
where ψ = ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−) and sψ measures the additional expected
benefit from verifying an additional policy proposal.
Expression (5.6) is perhaps best understood by considering the following: Suppose that
there is an increment to the number of policymakers, ceteris paribus, each lobbying firm
will be granted more access. More access for a given number of proposals in each lobbying
firm raises the probability that each will be presented, hence the price each citizen is
willing to pay to the lobbying firm, k, rises. Each lobbying firm then demands more
clients/proposals, however if this to not violate the adding up constraint for the total
population this must imply that there are fewer (but larger) lobbying firms. From this
little story we can then back out the various welfare effects. The first term on the right
hand side of (5.6) represents the direct effects of more policymakers, that is more ego rents
are realized and more, unverified, proposals can be enacted unambiguously raising social
welfare. The second term is the effect of more policymakers and therefore more access on
the per-firm rents that can be realized by lobbyists and extracted by policymakers, since
the firms receive a higher fee per proposal from citizens and then re-optimize by demanding
more clients it follows that this term is positive. The third term on the right hand side
of (5.6) is the effect of fewer lobbyists, first this tends to reduce the total rents that can
be extracted by policymakers, second as each lobbying firm continues to verify the same
37
number of proposals and as there are fewer firms and more access it must be the case
that the quality of information and the expected value of spillovers goes down, reducing
social welfare. We may conclude that it is welfare improving to increase the number of
policymakers above the first best if the increment to concentration of the lobbying industry
is small, if the gain in information from verification is small or if the increase in per-firm
rents from an increment to access is large.
Finally, we ask how a change of the policymakers’ quality, measured by the their taste
for financial contributions α, would affect social welfare at the full market equilibrium. We
have given a number of interpretation for α and it follows that a change in this variable
is subject to similar interpretations; for example if it represents dishonesty then a change
in α may be interpreted as a change in motoring activity or in social norms. It maybe be
that if there is heterogeneity in the population in terms of α then a change in this variable
may reflect choosing different individuals to be policymakers.
Differentiating of (5.5) with respect to α, gives
∂E[Πs#]
∂α
= L#
f# + α ∂f#∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ρ(x+)sψ
∂m#
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 , (5.7)
which can be re-written using the equilibrium conditions as
∂E[Πs#]
∂α
= L#
f# +
 (ρ(x+)sψ)2
α2T ∂
2F (m#)
∂mlp2
( 1
T
− 1
) R 0. (5.8)
We might anticipate that an increase in α would be unambiguously welfare improving
as it brings closer the value to a recipient and donor of any dollar transferred. However
a change in α also changes the contracts policymakers offer commercial lobbying firms.
As α increases they demand greater financial contributions and require lower levels of
verification.44 We know that because the policymaker fails to fully internalize spillovers
and does not fully take into account lobbying firms costs such that verification at the market
44See the Appendix 8.3.3 for calculations for the two effects. The result of the comparison is α ∂f
#
∂α
<
ρ(x+)sψ ∂m
#
∂α
.
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outcome can be too low or high relative to the first best, it is thus unsurprising that the
welfare effects of changes in α are ambiguous. We can however note that the general
implications of (5.8) are quite intuitive, an increase in α tends to raise social welfare when;
ρ(x+)sψ is small, that is the expected cost of reducing verification is small; when T is
small, that is when policymakers tend to take spillovers more in to account simply because
of self-interest; and, when ∂
2F (m#)
∂mlp2
is large, that is the costs of verification are rapidly
increasing such that there is little change in verification associated with a change in α.
Notice that if we interpret α as representing the policymakers honesty or integrity, then
perfectly honest policymakers may not be socially desirable.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the hither-to-fore neglected commercial lobbying indus-
try. It proposes an explanation for the existence of this industry, and supplies an analysis
of some of its potential impacts on social welfare.
We argue that commercial lobbying firms exist to provide an intermediation service
between citizens and policymakers. Citizens are endowed with policy proposals that if
enacted by policymakers have private benefits and social spillovers. The lobbying firms
are argued to possess a verification technology that allows them to observe a private signal
correlated with the social value of a policy proposal. This information has value to poli-
cymakers who allocate their scarce time to lobbyists in return for a portfolio that includes
policy proposals of a given quality and financial contributions. This political access the
lobbyists then sell to citizens by acting as their intermediaries with policymakers.
The introduction of commercial lobbyists as intermediaries between citizens and pol-
icymakers provides several new insights into lobbying and political influence. We derive
conditions under which the first best optimum involves commercial lobbying and when it
involves its prohibition. This depends on whether the benefits from implied improvements
in policy information outweigh the foregone private benefits from direct political access
for citizens plus the costs of commercial lobbying. We also demonstrate how commercial
lobbying arises endogenously in a simple general equilibrium market model, and identify
39
potential sources of inefficiencies. We find that, relative to the first best optimum when
commercial lobbying is socially desirable, the market equilibrium may involve inefficient
levels of verification activity by commercial lobbying firms, and an industry that may be
either too concentrated or insufficiently concentrated. We are able to provide intuitive
explanations of each of these potential biases.
Throughout most of our analysis we take the number of policymakers as fixed at the
first best optimal level and the preferences of these policymakers as exogenously given.
In our final section we explore the possibility that a deviation from first best institutions
can be welfare improving when allocations are market determined. The conclusion is
affirmative but the directions of the implied institutional changes are ambiguous, which is
not undesirable, as this allows us to suggest why we might anticipate seeing variations in
the number of policymakers and their characteristics in different countries and to anticipate
the welfare consequences of such.
Since this is, to our knowledge, the first formal economic model of the commercial lob-
bying industry our approach has been quite straightforward and there are many interesting
aspects of the industry not explored here that remain for future research. The informa-
tional assumptions made are deliberately simple. It would be interesting to examine the
same set of problems in an information structure where lobbyists’ actions are not directly
observable. Further there is no political competition in our analysis since all policymakers,
lobbyists and citizens are homogeneous (except for their given roles). It would seem that
the analysis can be extended in this direction by allowing heterogeneity amongst policy-
makers or citizens. Political competition based on either distributional conflict of efficiency
concerns then seems possible within the structure developed above.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs
8.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the first statement, suppose PAp > A. In case of an excess of political resources,
decreasing political resources by civilizing a policymaker would increase the number of
available proposals, which are in expected terms welfare increasing. This holds iff pic +
E[ec] > θ. If this condition would not hold, then it would be optimal to have a population
only consisting of policymakers. Now suppose PAp < A. It is not feasible that the number
of approved proposals exceeds the available government resources.
For the second statement, suppose PAp > C. In case of an excess of political resources,
decreasing political resources by civilizing a policymaker would increase the number of
available proposals, which are accepted because of PAp = A. This holds iff pic +E[ec] > θ.
Now suppose PAp < C. Assigning a disenfranchised citizen, who receives only a common
share of aggregate spillovers, to a government office would increase the expected social
welfare by Ap (pic + E[ec]) + θ.
Therefore, PAp = A and PAp = C.
8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For the first statement, PAp = P , see the proof for Proposition 1 in 8.1.1.
For the third statement, suppose ρ(x+)m∗L < PAp. This would describe an excess of po-
litical resources and approving proposals with negative verification signal would decrease
expected social welfare. Social welfare could be increased by decreasing government re-
sources and increasing the number of verified proposals supplied through more lobbyists.
Now suppose ρ(x+)m∗L > PAp. This excess of verification is socially wasteful and less
verification efforts would increase welfare.
For the second statement, suppose m∗L < C. Increasing the number of lobbyists would
increase the number of verified policy proposals. By assumption, commercial lobbying is
socially efficient and outweighs the costs of citizens now being a lobbyist. Now suppose
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m∗L > C. It is not feasible that there are more clients than citizens.
To summarize, it follows that PAp = A, m∗L = C, and ρ(x+)m∗L = PAp.
8.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The first statement relates to the comparison of P ∗ and P ∗∗. It follows that
P ∗ R P ∗∗
T
Ap + 1
R ρ(x
+)m∗T
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗ R Apρ(x+)m∗ + ρ(x+)m∗
1 +m∗ R ρ(x+)m∗
1 R
(
ρ(x+)− 1)m∗ (8.1)
where ρ(x+) ≤ 1 and m∗ > 0.
8.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2
If α ∈ (0, 1], then the first term in (4.10) is positive. Suppose λlp = 0, then (4.10) is
positive and a policymaker can increase his payoff by increasing f lp because of the lobbyist’s
financial resources. This contradicts λlp = 0.
Therefore, the lobbyists’ participation constraint has to bind for α 6= 0.
8.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
An auxiliary result used for the subsequent statements. Suppose a policymaker’s time
resource is exhausted - Ap =
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. It follows that
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]+ s
T
∂
∑
h6=l
a˜hp
∂a˜lp
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] = 0, (8.2)
since one proposal crowds out another. Using (4.11) and (8.2), this can be written as
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
= −ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp. (8.3)
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If ωlp > 0, then a˜lp = 0. Because of symmetry across lobbyists and exhausted political
resources it has to be true that ωlp = 0. Now suppose a policymaker’s resources are not
exhausted - Ap >
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. It follows that
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
=
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]− ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp. (8.4)
If ωlp = 0, then a policymaker would allocate more political access to lobbyists until
Ap =
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. On the other hand, if ωlp > 0 and Ap is not exhausted, then a policymaker
would grant further access to firm j with ωjp = 0.
For the first statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
> 0 and no unverified proposal is approved
because of an exhausted policymaker’s time constraint, then there is a corner solution
with respect to verified proposals. Using lemma 2, remaining resources are extracted via
financial contributions.
For the second statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
= 0 and α is sufficiently small such that
λlp =
ρ(x+) sT [ρ(e
+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]
∂F (.)
∂mlp
> α, (8.5)
then there is a corner solution with respect to verified and unverified proposals with f lp = 0.
The number of verified proposals follows from
nlk −
∑
h6=p
f lh − F
mco +∑
h6=p
mlh
−G(nl) = E[Πc|private ben.] (8.6)
with ulp > 0.
For the third statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
= ∂E[Π
p]
∂f lp
= 0, then there is an interior
solution with respect to verified and unverified proposals as well as financial contributions
such that
∂F (.)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] (8.7)
with ulp > 0 and f lp > 0.
For the fourth statement. Suppose α > ρ(x+) sT [ρ(e
+|x+) − ρ(e−|x+) − ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)].
In this case, the marginal benefit from a financial contribution outweighs the marginal
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benefit from a verified proposal independent of the amount of verification. The policymaker
extracts all resources via financial contributions and approves only unverified proposals.
8.1.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose C > nlL for a symmetric market equilibrium. A discouraged realizes a private
payoff of zero. Entering the lobbying industry given k, he could represent another discour-
aged citizen and contest the lobbying market equilibrium. Operating at lower marginal
processing costs, G′(.), the entrant has more resources to provide in exchange to political
access.
Now suppose C < nlL for a symmetric market equilibrium. It is not feasible that there
are more clients than citizens.
Therefore, C = nlL.
8.1.7 Uniqueness of Equilibrium Number of Clients per Firm
Define
H(n) =
n
1 + n
∂G(n)
∂n
. (8.8)
If H(n) is monotonically increasing or decreasing, then H(n) equal to a constant determines
a unique n. Taking the derivative of H(n) with respect to n, we have
∂H(n)
∂n
=
1
1 + n
∂G(n)
∂n
− n
(1 + n)2
∂G(n)
∂n
+
n
1 + n
∂2G(n)
∂n2
. (8.9)
The first two terms can be reduced to
1
1 + n
>
n
(1 + n)2
(8.10)
and therefore
∂H(n)
∂n
> 0 (8.11)
since ∂
2G(n)
∂n2
> 0.
Therefore the number of clients per firm is unique.
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8.1.8 Proof of Proposition 5
The policymaker’s first-order condition with respect to verification can be written for the
interior solution as
∂F (.)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] . (8.12)
To compare this to the social planner’s first-order condition with respect to verification we
can replace the right-hand side with the social planner’s first-order condition. We get
∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣∣
mlp=m#
=
1
αT
(
∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
+
∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=m∗
)
. (8.13)
When is m# R m∗ - i.e., ∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣
mlp=m#
R ∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
?
Suppose ∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
= (α1T1 − 1) ∂F (.)∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
. Then (8.13) can be written as
∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣∣
mlp=m#
=
∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
. (8.14)
Therefore, m# = m∗.
Suppose ∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
< (α2T2 − 1) ∂F (.)∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
. This can be written as ∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
=
(α2T2 − 1) ∂F (.)∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
−  with  > 0. Then (8.13) can be written as
∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣∣
mlp=m#
=
∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
− 
α2T2
. (8.15)
Therefore, m# < m∗.
Suppose ∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
> (α3T3 − 1) ∂F (.)∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
. This can be written as ∂G(.)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
=
(α3T3 − 1) ∂F (.)∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
+  with  > 0. Then (8.13) can be written as
∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣∣
mlp=m#
=
∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
+

α3T3
. (8.16)
Therefore, m# > m∗.
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8.1.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose P¯ = P ∗∗. All political resources are exhausted and it follows that
ρ(x+)L∗∗m∗ = P¯Ap = L#
(
ρ(x+)m# + u#
)
. (8.17)
For the first statement. If m# > m∗, then L# < L∗∗. This is independent of u#. Given the
number of policymakers and the population size, it follows that C# > C∗∗. Using lemma
3, we can conclude that the industry is larger, N# > N∗∗, and with symmetry, firms are
larger, n# > n∗∗.
Therefore, the industry is more concentrated with fewer but larger firms.
For the second statement. Suppose m# < m∗, then the following analysis depends on
the level of u#. If ρ(x+)m∗ > ρ(x+)m# + u#, then L∗∗ < L#. Given the number of
policymakers and the population size, it follows that C# < C∗∗. Using lemma 3, we
can state that the industry is smaller, N# < N∗∗, and by symmetry, firms are smaller,
n# < n∗∗.
If ρ(x+)m∗ < ρ(x+)m# + u#, then L∗∗ > L#. Given the number of policymakers and
the population size, it follows that C# > C∗∗. Using lemma 3, we can conclude that the
industry is larger, N# > N∗∗, and by symmetry, firms are larger, n# > n∗∗.
Therefore, if the commercial lobbying industry is more concentrated or less concentrated
than socially efficient depends on ρ(x+)m∗ R ρ(x+)m# + u#.
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8.2 Perfectly Honest Policymakers
For the special case of perfectly honest policymakers, α = 0, who do not value financial
contributions, we can state the following.
Proposition 7. If lobbying contacts have sufficient lobbying resources, then each perfectly
honest policymaker approves only proposals with positive verification signals.
Proof. Take (4.9) and suppose λlp = 0. So we can write
∂E[Πp]
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]− ρ(x−)ωlp ≤ 0. (8.18)
Further suppose ωlp = 0. It follows that there is a corner solution with only approved
proposals with positive verification signals and exhausted political resources.
Now suppose ωlp > 0. In this case all available policy proposals are verified and political
resources are not exhausted since proposals with negative verification signals are ignored.
Therefore, only proposals with positive verification signals are approved if there are enough
lobbying resources.
Each perfectly honest policymaker maximizes expected spillovers given firms’ resources.
But it is not necessarily the case that this is socially efficient. A perfectly honest, but self-
interested, policymaker does not internalize the costs of lobbying. Furthermore because
other agents in the economy do not fully internalize spillovers, the policymaker may face
a resource constraint in terms of resources to finance verification. Notice that these two
distortions with respect to verification work in opposite directions creating the possibility
that verification will be at the socially optimal level.
Lemma 5. If there are sufficient financial resources in each lobbying firm to verify all
presented proposals, then a perfectly honest policymaker does not dissipate all private eco-
nomic rents. However, if there are insufficient financial resources to verify all presented
proposals, then perfectly honest policymakers’ demands for verification exhaust all private
rents.
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If revenues earned from lobbying equal or exceed the processing and requested verification
costs, λlp = 0, and enough citizens hire lobbyists, ωlp = 0, then lobbyists realize a positive
economic profit. In comparison to the case of a dishonest policymaker, a perfectly honest
policymaker requests exclusively proposals with positive verification signals and does not
request financial contributions to extract remaining economic lobbying rents. However, a
perfectly honest policymaker’s verification demands may exhaust all lobbying rents and
cause that lobbying firms break even.
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8.3 Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
8.3.1 Jacobian
Population:
g1 = T − P¯ − C − L = 0. (8.19)
Political access:
g2 = P¯A
p − L
(
ρ(x+)ml + ul
)
= 0. (8.20)
Free entry:
g3 = n
lk − F (ml)−G(nl)− f l − ρ(x
+)ml + ul
nl
pic + k = 0. (8.21)
with symmetry for ∀ l.
Demand for commercial lobbying services:
g4 =
P¯Ap
Lnl
pic − k = 0. (8.22)
Supply of commercial lobbying services:
g5 =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
− k = 0. (8.23)
Total number of clients:
g6 = C − nlL = 0. (8.24)
Verification effort per firm:
g7 =
∂F (ml)
∂mlp
− ρ(x+) s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] = 0 (8.25)
with ml = P¯mlp.
Firm’s proposal portfolio:
g8 = n
l −ml − ul − rl = 0. (8.26)
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The general Jacobian, J , of the system of equilibrium equations can be written as
J =

∂g1
∂L
∂g1
∂C
∂g1
∂nl
∂g1
∂k
∂g1
∂ml
∂g1
∂ul
∂g1
∂rl
∂g1
∂f l
∂g2
∂L
∂g2
∂C
∂g2
∂nl
∂g2
∂k
∂g2
∂ml
∂g2
∂ul
∂g2
∂rl
∂g2
∂f l
∂g3
∂L
∂g3
∂C
∂g3
∂nl
∂g3
∂k
∂g3
∂ml
∂g3
∂ul
∂g3
∂rl
∂g3
∂f l
∂g4
∂L
∂g4
∂C
∂g4
∂nl
∂g4
∂k
∂g4
∂ml
∂g4
∂ul
∂g4
∂rl
∂g4
∂f l
∂g5
∂L
∂g5
∂C
∂g5
∂nl
∂g5
∂k
∂g5
∂ml
∂g5
∂ul
∂g5
∂rl
∂g5
∂f l
∂g6
∂L
∂g6
∂C
∂g6
∂nl
∂g6
∂k
∂g6
∂ml
∂g6
∂ul
∂g6
∂rl
∂g6
∂f l
∂g7
∂L
∂g7
∂C
∂g7
∂nl
∂g7
∂k
∂g7
∂ml
∂g7
∂ul
∂g7
∂rl
∂g7
∂f l
∂g8
∂L
∂g8
∂C
∂g8
∂nl
∂g8
∂k
∂g8
∂ml
∂g8
∂ul
∂g8
∂rl
∂g8
∂f l

. (8.27)
Given the equations above, the Jacobian can be written as
J =

−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−ρ(x+)ml − ul 0 0 0 −ρ(x+)L −L 0 0
0 0 k − ∂G(nl)
∂nl
+
(ρ(x+)ml+ul)pic
nl2
nl + 1 −∂F (ml)
∂ml
− ρ(x+)pic
nl
pic
nl
0 −1
− P¯Appic
L2nl
0 − P¯Appic
Lnl2
−1 0 0 0 0
0 0 ∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
−1 0 0 0 0
−nl 1 −L 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 −1 −1 0

.
(8.28)
8.3.2 Determinant of Jacobian
The determinant of the Jacobian is
|J | = −
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
nl
2 < 0. (8.29)
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8.3.3 Comparative Statics
Cramer’s Rule For the comparative statics we can use Cramer’s Rule defined by
∂y
∂x
=
|Jy|
|J | , (8.30)
where y is an endogenous parameter and x an exogenous variable.
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Government Size Verification per
firm
∂m#
∂P¯
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (8.31)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂P¯
=
|JL|
|J | = −
Appic
(
Lnl + P¯
)
+ Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (8.32)
Citizens
∂C#
∂P¯
=
|JC |
|J | =
Lnl
(
Appic − nl2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
R 0. (8.33)
The sign depends on Appic − nl2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
R 0.
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂P¯
=
|Jn|
|J | =
Appicnl
(
L+ Lnl + P¯
)
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (8.34)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂P¯
=
|Jk|
|J | =
Appicnl
(
L+ Lnl + P¯
) ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (8.35)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂P¯
=
|Ju|
|J | =
Appic
(
P¯Ap + (Lnl + P¯ )(ρ(x+)ml + ul)
)
+ Lnl
2
(Ap +Apnl + ρ(x+)ml + ul)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0.
(8.36)
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Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂P¯
=
pictn
l
t
2
Apt
(
L+ Lnlt + P¯
) ∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
L
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
) > 0. (8.37)
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Dishonesty Verification per firm
∂m#
∂α
=
|Jm|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
s
α2T
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (8.38)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂α
=
|JL|
|J | = 0. (8.39)
Citizens
∂C#
∂α
=
|JC |
|J | = 0. (8.40)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂α
=
|Jn|
|J | = 0. (8.41)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂α
=
|Jk|
|J | = 0. (8.42)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂α
=
|Ju|
|J | = ρ(x
+)2
s
α2T
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (8.43)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂α
=
|Jf |
|J | = ρ(x
+)
s
α2T
ψ
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (8.44)
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Spillovers Verification per firm
∂m#
∂s
=
|Jm|
|J | = ρ(x
+)
1
αT
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (8.45)
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Lobbyists
∂L#
∂s
=
|JL|
|J | = 0. (8.46)
Citizens
∂C#
∂s
=
|JC |
|J | = 0. (8.47)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂s
=
|Jn|
|J | = 0. (8.48)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂s
=
|Jk|
|J | = 0. (8.49)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂s
=
|Ju|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)2
1
αT
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (8.50)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂s
=
|Jf |
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
1
αT
ψ
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (8.51)
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Private Benefits Verification per
firm
∂m#
∂pic
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (8.52)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂pic
=
|JL|
|J | = −
P¯ApLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (8.53)
Citizens
∂C#
∂pic
=
|JC |
|J | =
P¯ApLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.54)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂pic
=
|Jn|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(1 + nl)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.55)
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Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂pic
=
|Jk|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.56)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂pic
=
|Ju|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(ρ(x+)ml + ul)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.57)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂pic
=
|Jf |
|J | =
nlt
2
(1 + nlt)P¯A
p
t
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
> 0. (8.58)
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Population Verification per firm
∂m#
∂T
=
|Jm|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
s
αT 2
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (8.59)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂T
=
|JL|
|J | =
P¯Appic + Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.60)
Citizens
∂C#
∂T
=
|JC |
|J | =
Lnl
3 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.61)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂T
=
|Jn|
|J | = −
P¯Appicnl
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) < 0. (8.62)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂T
=
|Jk|
|J | = −
P¯Appicnl ∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) < 0. (8.63)
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Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂T
=
|Ju|
|J | =
−αT 2 (ρ(x+)ml + ul) ∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
αLT 2 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
+
ρ(x+)2sLψ
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
αLT 2 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) R 0. (8.64)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂T
=
|Jf |
|J |
=
ρ(x+)sψL
∂F (mlt)
∂mlt
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
)
− αpictnlt2P¯AptT 2 ∂
2F (mlt)
∂mlt
2
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
αLT 2
∂2F (mlt)
∂mlt
2
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
) R 0.(8.65)
Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Political Resources Verification
per firm
∂m#
∂Ap
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (8.66)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂Ap
=
|JL|
|J | = −
P¯ picLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (8.67)
Citizens
∂C#
∂Ap
=
|JC |
|J | =
P¯ picLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.68)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂Ap
=
|Jn|
|J | =
P¯ picnl(1 + nl)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.69)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂Ap
=
|Jk|
|J | =
P¯ picnl(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (8.70)
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Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂Ap
=
|Ju|
|J | =
P¯
(
pic
(
P¯Ap + Lnl
(
ρ(x+)ml + ul
))
+ Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (8.71)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂Ap
=
|Jf |
|J | =
P¯ pictn
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
> 0. (8.72)
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